Dansk Filosofisk Selskab Årsmøde 2011 > Program og manchetter

FILOSOFIÅRSMØDE 2011

Københavns Universitet

REGISTRERING ved lokale 23.0.49

10.00-11.00

11.00 Velkomst

Keynote speech

11.15-12.45

Auditorium 23.0.49

Galen Strawson:

‘We live beyondany tale that we happen to enact’.

Frokost

(På balkonen i KUA-kantinen for deltagere med reservation)

12.45-13.30

SESSIONER

FREDAG 4. MARTS

SESSION I. 13.30 - 15.45

Epistemology Session 1

Lokale 24.1.45

13.30 - 15.45

Chair: Klemens Kappel

Nikolaj Nottelmann: Against Deontic Uniqueness

Douglas Edwards: Deflationary Functionalism about Truth

Kristoffer Ahlström: Moderate Epistemic Expressivism

Analytisk oganvendt etik Session 1

13.30 - 15.45

Lokale 23.2.47

Patrik Kjærsdam Telleus: Moralskansvarlighed, videnskab og forskning

Kasper Mosekjær: TBA

Philosophyof mind Session 1

13.30 - 15.45

Lokale 27.0.17

NiveditaGangopadhyay: The perception of otherminds

BoStarlit: Are they rivals? Phenomenology,mindreading and the different problems of social cognition

ThorGrünbaum: Demonstrative Intentions

Filosofihistorie indtil1600-tallet

13.30 - 15.45

Lokale 27.0.49

UnnIrene Aasdalen: Prestinne eller profet? Marsilio Ficinos gjenbruk avPlatons Diotima i Symposium-kommentaren De amore (1469)

AkselHaaning: Den hermetiske filosofi før

Marsilio Ficino(1433-1499). Tema og perspektiver

FrankBeck Lassen: "Navigare necesse est.Begrebet ‘Curiositas’ og dets metaforiske tematisering i Francis Bacons NovumOrganum (1620)")

Matematikkens filosofi Session 1

13.30 - 15.45

Lokale 24.2.11

Mikkel Willum Johansen: Er matematik embodied?

Mette Engelbrecht Larsen: Nik Weavers matematiskekonceptualisme

StigAndur Pedersen: Numerisk Algoritme, et begreb i drift.

Etik ogPolitisk Filosofi Session 1

13.30 - 15.45

Lokale 27.0.47

SørenJuul: Solidaritet, anerkendelse,retfærdighed og god dømmekraft

 MortenS. Thanning: Fromhed og demokratikritikhos Sofokles og Platon

Øjvind Larsen: Fra Periklestil Platon: Fra demokratisk politisk praksis til totalitær politisk filosofi

 Anvendt politisk filosofi

13.30 - 15.45

Lokale 23.2.39

Martin Lemberg-Pedersen: A Normative Assessment of EU Discourses forJustice and Home Affairs Externalization

Martin Marchman Andersen: How and When are Social Inequalities inHealth Unjust?

Claus Strue Frederiksen: Den konsekventialistiske udfording tilvirksomheders sociale ansvar

Kaffe og kage 15.45-16.00

Ved lokale 23.0.49 og lokale 27.0.17

SESSION II, 16.00 - 18.15

Epistemology Session 2

16.00 - 18.15

Lokale 24.1.45

Chair: Kristoffer Ahlström

Lars Binderup & Nikolaj Jang Lee LindingPedersen:

Two epistemological paths to state neutrality: Barry vs. Rawls onlegitimacy 

Karin Jønch-Clausen and Klemens Kappel: Social Epistemic Liberalism andNon-Scientific Belief

Sune Bjarke Stefansson: Intellectual Property from an epistemic point of view

Philosophyof mind Session 2

16.00 - 18.15

Lokale 27.0.17

KristianMoltke Martiny: Cognition with the Bodyin Mind

OliverKauffmann: Promises and pitfalls for astrong embodied theory of cognition

MaltheNielsen : Are emotions cognitive?

Analytisk oganvendt etik Session 2

16.00 - 18.15

Lokale 23.2.47

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen: Lighedog diskrimination

Frej Klem Thomsen: Nondiscriminationas 2nd-Order Norm

Filosofihistorie efter1600-tallet:

16.00 - 18.15

Lokale 27.0.49

JørgenHuggler: G. W. Leibniz’ bog Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain

Lise Huggler: Om frasen "local attachment"sudvikling i den anden halvdel af 1700-tallet i Storbritannien.

Matematikkens filosofi Session 2

16.00 - 18.15 

Lokale 24.2.11

Jessica Carter: Brug af repræsentationer i matematisk ræsonneren

KlausFrovin Jørgensen: Gödel og semantikken for intuitionistisk logic

Henrik Kragh Sørensen: Mellem eksperimenter, billeder og beviser: Hvordan ”eksperimentelle”matematiske resultater bliver robuste

AntropologiskFilosofi

16.00 - 18.15 

Lokale23.0.49

MogensPahuus

Skyld og skam.

ThomasSchwartz Wentzer: Mennesket, det responsivevæsen

Kasper Lysemose:Kierkegaard om udødeligheden - eksistentialiseringen af en antropologiskkategori

Anne-MarieChristensen

Erfaret skyld

Videnskabsfilosofi

16.00 - 18.15 

Lokale 23.2.39

JulieZahle: Participant Observation: Finding out about PracticalNorms

DavidBudtz Pedersen: Explanation,reductionism and the future Christian Beenfeldt (Titel annonceres senere)

Teknologifilosofi Session 1

16.00 - 18.15

Lokale 27.1.47

Sune Holm:The Role of Ontology in the Ethics of SyntheticBiology

Søren Riis:The Ultimate Technology: The End of Technology and theTask of Biology

Pelle Guldborg Hansen: Nudge 101: thereal issues

Generalforsamling i Dansk Filosofisk Selskab

18.15-19.00

Auditorium 23.0.49

Middag

19.00

(På balkonen i KUA-kantinen for deltagere med reservation)

LØRDAG 5. MARTS

Kaffe ved lokale 23.0.49 kl. 9.00

SESSION III, 9.15 - 12.00

Epistemology Session 3

9.15 - 12.00

Lokale 24.1.45

Chair: Emil Lundbjerg Møller

Jesper Kallestrup: Towards Epistemic Social Externalism

Jens Christian Bjerring & Nikolaj Jang LeeLinding Pedersen: All the (many, many)things we know: extended knowledge

Klemens Kappel: Knowledge, Truth by Luck, and What Solves the Gettier Problem

Musik og kontekst/Music and Context  

9.15 - 12.00

Lokale23.0.49

Tovholder/Chair:Cynthia M. Grund

Publikumsom kontekst

Cynthia  M. Grund & William Westney,præsenteret af Cynthia M. Grund

(Audienceas Context, Cynthia M.Grund & William Westney, presented by Cynthia M. Grund)

Detvisuelles betydning for musikoplevelsen

Søren R. Frimodt-Møller

(Visual Cues for MusicExperience,Søren R. Frimodt-Møller)

Musikalskudtryk som responsafhængig egenskab

Daniel Frandsen

(Musical Expressiveness asResponse-Dependent, Daniel Frandsen)

Musik& kontekstuel erkendelse

Søren Arani Mortensen

(Music& Contextual Knowledge, Søren Arani Mortensen)

Teknologifilosofi Session 2

9.15 - 12.00

Lokale 27.1.47

Finn Olesen:Teknologifilosofi og telemedicinsk mediering

Kasper Schølin: Heidegger ipraksis

Analytisk oganvendt etik

9.15 - 12.00

Lokale 23.2.47

 Thomas Søbirk Petersen & Søren S. Wichmann:

 Poverty Relief:Philanthrophy or System Change? A Critical Discussion of Cosmopolitanobjections to ‘The Singer Solution’

SuneLægaard

Klimaflygtninge

Religionsfilosofi

9.15 - 12.00

Lokale 23.2.39

Anne-MariePahuus: Tilgivelse hos Løgstrup og Arendt

NielsGrønkjær: Den nye Gud - et bidrag tilefter-metafysisk religionsfilosofi

HenrikVase Frandsen: Undervisning og heteronomihos Lévinas

Negative emotioner og attituder: afsky, had og pessimisme

9.15 - 12.00

Lokale 24.2.11

Tovholder:Ditte Marie Munch-Hansen

Ditte Marie Munch-Hansen: Afsky: den umoralske aktørs moralfølelse?

Thomas Brudholm: Had, vrede og dehumanisering

Per Jepsen: Er misantropi en gave? - Refleksioner over et tema ipessimismens historie

Frokost

(På balkonen i KUA-kantinen for deltagere med reservation)

12.00-13.00

SESSION IV

Epistemology Session 4

13.00 – 14.45

Lokale 24.1.45

Chair: Jesper Kallestrup

Emil Lundbjerg Møller: On What to Believe about How We Ought to Think

Asger Steffensen: Modal epistemology and Conceivability

Teknologifilosofi Session 3

13.00 - 14.45

Lokale 27.1.47

Mats Fridlund:The thingness of terrorisms: The artifacts,affordances and affects of the materialities of fear

Michael May:Distributed cognition and artefacts: affordancesand/or representations

Philosophyof mind Session 3

13.00 - 14.45

Lokale27.0.47

JoelKrueger: Emotions and Other Minds

SørenOvergaard: What is the Interaction Theoryof social cognition?

Analytisk oganvendt etik:

13.00 – 14.45

Lokale 23.2.47

Xavier Landes og Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen: Inequality at home

Nils Holtug: Nationalism,Secularism and Liberal Neutrality: The Danish Case of Judges and ReligiousSymbols

Keynote speech

15.00 – 16.15

Auditorium 23.0.49

Daniel Robinson:

Explanation and the“Brain” Sciences

Afslutning

16.15

ABSTRACTS

Keynote speakers

Galen Strawson: We live beyond any tale that we happen to enact

Some say [1] we all experience or conceive of their own lives as anarrative or story of some sort. Many more say [2] we ought to do this. I arguethat both these claims are false (Strawson 2004). Many go on to claim somethingmore specific: we not only experience our own lives as a narrative of somesort, but [3] we constitute our identity as a person or self in this way (the‘narrative self-constitution thesis’). Others again claim that [4] we ought toconstitute our identity in this way. Again I reject both claims: people arevery different; there are different good ways to be and to live. SupposeSocrates is right (it may be doubted) that the unexamined life is not a lifefor a human being: suppose he’s right that self-examination is always a goodthing. Even so, the narrative approach is not the only way to do it, nor thebest way. I advise against it, calling Emerson, Proust, Woolf, and others insupport.

Daniel Robinson: Explanation and the “Brain” Sciences

“Increasingly specialists in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy ofmind have attempted to merge the traditionally distinct perspectives associated with these disciplines.  Claims of progress seem to be based on a mistaken set of assumptions in the matter of explanation”.

SESSIONS-FOREDRAG

A

KristofferAhlström: Moderate Epistemic Expressivism

Inthe present talk, I argue that there are at least two equally plausible yetmutually incompatible answers to the question of what is of non-instrumentalepistemic value. The hypothesis invoked to explain how this can be so—moderateepistemic expressivism—holds that epistemic norms are grounded in nothing butcommitments to particular notions of inquiry, and that there is more than oneviable notion of inquiry. Further investigation reveals that such expressivismnot only survives the arguments that have been leveraged recently against amore radical form of epistemic expressivism, but also receives further supportfrom the failure of the two most promising attempts to ground claims aboutepistemic value in something other than commitments to particular notions ofinquiry.

B

LarsBinderup & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen: Two epistemological pathsto state neutrality: Barry vs. Rawls on legitimacy 

Someliberals attempt to justify a requirement of state neutrality by advancingarguments that, in crucial respects, are of an epistemic nature. In particular,Brian Barry has argued that awareness of the existence of profound disagreementover religious and moral issues ought to make us all less sure about our own(initial) views on such matters, epistemically speaking. There can be noreasonable disagreements over these kinds of questions, in the sense thatpeople aware of the disagreement can maintain their initial view withoutlowering their credence. This, in turn, makes it illegitimate for any ofus to base state laws on views about religion or morality. John Rawls holds anopposing view---that there can indeed be reasonable disagreements overreligious or moral issues. However, like Barry, he is in favour of therequirement of state neutrality. We discuss the debate between Barry and Rawlsin light of the recent literature on the epistemic significance ofdisagreement. We suggest that the differences between the two can be traced totheir sympathetic stance towards respectively conformism (Barry) andnon-conformism (Rawls), the two main views on the epistemic significance ofdisagreement. 

JensChristian Bjerring & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen: All the (many,many) things we know: extended knowledge

Twointriguing theses have recently emerged in philosophy of mind and cognitivescience: the Extended Cognition and Mind Theses. According to the former,cognitive processes can extend beyond the body of the agent into the externalenvironment. According to the latter, states of mind such as beliefs can bepartly constituted by features of the external environment. Just like we saythat Ida believed that Bo lives on Ågade before she consulted her memory, wemight say that John, who suffers from Alzheimer's disease, believed the samebefore he consulted the book he always relies on for addresses. Some theoristshave argued that there is no relevant difference between respectively Ida'srelying on memory and John's relying on the address book. They are both readilyavailable and seem to play the same role as sources of information and groundsfor action. The main objective of the talk is to explore the epistemologicalsignificance of the Extended Cognition and Mind Theses by investigating theirbearing on knowledge for boundedly rational agents. First, we explore thenature of knowledge. It would seem to be radically different from what it isoften thought to be if cognitive processes and beliefs can be partly determinedby readily available resources in the external environment—includingtechnological devices (e.g. iPhones) and divisions of cognitive labor (e.g.news channels). Second, we explore the potential consequences of the ExtendedCognition and Mind Theses for knowledge in light of boundedrationality—rationality for agents with bounded cognitive capacities, just likeyou and I. We discuss whether the theses commit one to the claim that boundedagents should know, and do know, many, many things—or, in any case, way morethings than ordinarily thought. 

ThomasBrudholm: Had, vrede og dehumanisering

Althoughsometimes forgotten in current uses of the term, ‘hatred’ is a

notoriouslycomplex and ambiguous phenomenon. Analyzing and identifying what characterizeshatred and articulating a concept that helps us think more clearly about hatredis difficult. It is not even clear whether hatred is an emotion, an attitude, asentiment or a passion. This essay departs from the idea that perhaps hatred isanalyzable as a retributive reactive attitude. More precisely, it presents aphilosophical exploration of what happens if one puts a messy bundle of notionsand examples of hatred into the more

clearconceptual framework offered by Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Thequestion whether hatred can be seen as a retributive reactive attitude isexamined both with respect to Strawson’s division between participant andobjective attitudes and with respect to the seemingly most closely relatedparticipant attitude, resentment (Oplægget vil blive holdt på dansk, artiklenbag oplægget kan læses i Philosophical Papers 39 (3), (November 2010):289-313.)

C

JessicaCarter, Brug af repræsentationer i matematisk ræsonneren.

EmilyGrosholz har i bogen 'Representation and Productive Ambiguity in Mathematicsand the Sciences' argumenteret for at man ved at bruge flertydighed afbenyttede repræsentationer i matematikken opnår nye resultater. Dette kalderhun 'productive ambiguity' og beskriver det næsten som et overraskende fænomen.Hun gengiver eksempler hvor repræsentationer både repræsenterer som ikoner ogsom symboler. Jeg vil i foredraget vise et eksempel fra nutidig matematik (frisandsynlighedsteori) hvor ræsonneren netop foregår som et samspil mellemforskellige repræsentationer. Jeg vil vise at samspillet især er mellemikoniske repræsentationer, det vil sige repræsentationer som repæsenterer vedlighed (eller relationer) og indeksikalske repræsentationer, som gør at det ermuligt at sætte delene sammen til en helhed i det endelige bevis.

Anne-Marie Christensen: Erfaretskyld

En del fremtrædende analyser af begrebet ’skyld’beskriver det som en emotion, der udspringer af subjektets forhold til egne,tidligere handlinger. Jeg vil i oplægget præsentere denne opfattelse af skyldog problematisere den ud fra muligheden af ’uforskyldt skyld’. Gennem enundersøgelse af styrker og svagheder ved en række gængse, filosofiskebeskrivelser af uforskyldt skyld vil jeg argumentere for, at skyld bedstebeskrives som en reaktion, snarere end en emotion, og at en idé om konkret,etisk erfaring er nødvendig for en fuld forståelse af grundlæggende etiskebegreber som skyld og ansvar.

D

E

DouglasEdwards: Deflationary Functionalism about Truth

Inthis paper I introduce and consider the prospects for 'deflationaryfunctionalism' about truth, a view which occupies an intermediary positionbetween so-called 'inflationary' and 'deflationary' theories of truth. Isuggest that this view has the potential to yield some theoretical benefitsthat perhaps should give us reason to consider it as an option in contemporarydebates about the nature of truth.

F 

DanielFrandsen: Musikalsk udtryk som responsafhængig egenskab

Kanmusik udtrykke følelser? I forsøget på at beskrive et stykke musik som noget,der udtrykker eksempelvis aggression, ender en sådan beskrivelse ofte med atvære meget subjektiv. Dette tyder på, at den ekspressive kvalitet er noget, derikke kan tilskrives selve musikken. Hvordan kan debatten om musikalsk betydningså være meningsfuld? I min præsentation vil jeg forsøge at give en definitionaf musikalsk udtryksfulhed på baggrund af betingelserne for responsafhængigeegenskaber, som disse er fremsat af Crispin Wright.

DanielFrandsen: Musical Expressiveness as Response-Dependent

Canmusic express emotions? When one tries to describe a piece of music asexpressing, say, aggression, such a description will often be very subjective.This points to the expressive quality as something which cannot be ascribed tothe music itself. How, then, can we make sense of the debate about musicalmeaning? In my presentation, I will attempt to give a definition of musicalexpressiveness, drawing on the conditions for response-dependent properties asput forward by Crispin Wright.

MatsFridlund: The thingness of terrorisms: The artifacts, affordances andaffects of the materialities of fear

Howcan the philosophy of technology contribute to helping us better understand therole of materiality in co-shaping political subjectivities and ideologies?Against a back-ground of postphenomenological philosophy the presentationdiscuss how the thinginess - artifactual affordances and affects - of dynamite,revolvers and gas-masks have been central in shaping the state terrors andterrorisms of 20th century Britain and 19th century.

JanKyrre Berg Olsen Friis og Lucy Lyons: Looking and the Issues of ObserverVariability

Thispaper takes the position that the act of looking is a vital but often neglectedskilled process. We argue that the importance of looking lies in the art ofobservation and this is not necessarily connected to objectivity.

Weexamine issues of subjectivity surrounding observer variability wheninterpreting medical images. Rather than attempt to seek solutions, variabilityis seen here to be a valuable aspect of subjectivity that should beincorporated into the process of understanding visual information instead ofbeing ignored or corrected.

Subjectivityis shown to occur during the process of interpreting an image but starts at thepoint of an image’s creation. Focusing on the relationship between observer andthe observed phenomena, evidence will be taken from historical examplesincluding the work of Goethe and Darwin, from studies into the methods ofpractice and teaching of radiologists and from practical case studiesincorporating the use of drawing as a phenomenological activity used as amethod of engagement. These will form the basis of the suggestion that theactivity of drawing could reintroduce the art of seeing and improve the breadthof understanding in medical imaging.

Wewill conclude that it is not the issue of observer variability that needs to beaddressed but the process of looking itself and suggest that the subjective,interpretive engagement that occurs through the act of drawing may lead togreater depth and understanding and reveal broader information.

SørenR. Frimodt-Møller: Det visuelles betydning for musikoplevelsen

Voresoplevelse af et stykke musik påvirkes altid af forhold, der ligger ud over det,vi hører musikerne frembringe. F.eks. påvirkes vores musikoplevelse af socialefaktorer i situationen, auditive faktorer uden for selve musikopførelsen (eller-optagelsen) samt visuelle faktorer. I en musikkultur, hvor marketing spillerden mest fremtrædende rolle i kredsløbet fra komponist og musiker til lytter,bliver en diskussion af, hvordan vores indgang til et stykke musik farves afvisuelle stimuli (bevidst udnyttet af f.eks. videoinstruktører ogalbumcoverkunstnere), uhyre relevant. Denne præsentation tager fat på dennediskussion.

SørenR. Frimodt-Møller: Visual Cues for Music Experience

Ourexperience of music is influenced by the context of the situation in whichlistening takes place. This context includes social aspects, auditive aspectsoutside of the music performance (or recording) itself, and visual aspects. Ina music culture where marketing plays the most vital role in the circuit fromcomposer and performer to listener, it becomes highly relevant to discuss howvisual cues are consciously used by video directors and album cover artists inorder to shape our initial approach to a piece of music. This is exactly what Iwill start to do in this presentation.

G

Cynthia M. Grund & William Westney: Publikum som kontekst

Idenne præsentation undersøger vi den rolle, som publikummet, der er til stedeved opførelsen af  live musik, spiller i skabelsen af performance-oplevelsen som helhed. Følsomme musikudøvere er meget opmærksomme på derespublikum og kendsgerningen, at ethvert publikum ser ud til – ofte stiltiende -at forme en performance med henblik på dens fortolkningmæssige, æstetiske ogsemantiske egenskaber. 

Forat vinde større indsigt i, hvilke specifikke egenskaber der er på banen, tagervi som udgangspunkt tre performance-sammenhænge, som er radikalt forskelligefra hindanden: en ”Un-Master Class”, designet og ledet af pianist og professorWilliam Westney; en frokostkoncert i kantinen ved Syddansk Universitet, hvorWestney spiller udvalgte stykker fra sit standardkoncertrepertoire; og entraditionel, formel koncert, hvor dette repertoire udføres i Alsions koncertsali Sønderborg. Videomateriale fra hver opførelsessituation vil supplere ogunderbygge den teoretiske diskussion.

Cynthia M. Grund & William Westney: Audience as Context

Inthis presentation the role played by the audience for a live musicalperformance in constructing the total performance experience is examined.Sensitive musical performers are keenly aware of their audiences and the factthat each audience seems to shape a performance – often tacitly – with regardto its interpretive, aesthetic and semantic properties. 

Togain greater insight into what specific properties are at issue, we take as apoint of departure three radically different performance situations: an“Un-Master Class” as conceived and led by concert pianist Prof. WilliamWestney; a lunchtime concert in the cafeteria at the University of SouthernDenmark in which Westney performs a portion of his standard recital repertoire;and a traditional, formal recital of this repertoire at Alsion Concert Hall inSønderborg. Video material from each performance situation will supplement andsupport the theoretical discussion.

H

PelleGuldborg Hansen: Nudge 101: the real issues

Inthe last decade the so called "Nudging paradigm" has gained ground asa much preferred approach in the various attempts made by public institutionsand organizations to change citizens' behavior. The paradigm is subject of muchconfusion, though, since commentators, including philosophers, without furtherknowledge about the discipline of behavioral economics in which the paradigm isrooted, seeks to interpret it within their usual frameworks of understanding.The presentation will provide an overview of key criticisms of Nudging todiscuss which these are real issues, and which of these are based onmisunderstandings.

SuneHolm: The Role of Ontology in the Ethics of Synthetic Biology

Assessmentsand outlines of the nascent but rapidly growing field of synthetic biologypersistently call for conceptual clarification with regard to the potentialproducts of synthetic biology. Such clarification is often said to be ofethical significance. In this paper I set out to explore the ontological statusof the expected products of synthetic biology focusing on the concepts ofengineered machine and naturally evolved organism, and the distinction betweenthe natural and the artificial and the living and the nonliving. I end byconsidering the normative aspects, if any, of these concepts and distinctions.

I

J

PerJepsen: Er misantropi en gave? Refleksioner over et tema i pessimismenshistorie

”Sidenjeg har lært menneskene at kende, elsker jeg dyrene”, skriver Schopenhauer. Menhvad siger det om `det fornuftsbegavede dyr´ - altså mennesket -, at det rummermuligheden for en sådan radikal negation af det menneskelige? Hvilkeerkendelser gemmer der sig for den filosofiske antropologi i studiet afmisantropien som muligt menneskeligt selv- og verdensforhold? Og i hvilkenudstrækning lader misantropien sig på samme tid udlægge som en praksisrettetnegation, der er beslægtet med utopien  og den sociale protest? Foredragetvil med afsæt i et igangværende forskningsprojekt om pessimismens historieforsøge at svare på nogle af disse spørgsmål.

MikkelWillum Johansen: Er matematik embodied?

Matematiker den ultimative udfordring for embodied cognition-paradigmet; matematikkensobjekter er abstrakte, ideelle objekter, vi ikke kan se eller røre, ogmatematisk tænkning identificeres traditionelt med rene deduktive slutninger.Det er derfor ikke oplagt, at matematikerens krop eller evne til at interageremed sine omgivelser skulle spille nogen rolle for produktionen af matematisk viden.I mit foredrag vil jeg diskutere, i hvilken grad matematikken kan siges at væreembodied og overveje i hvilket omfang dette har konsekvenser for matematikkenssærlige status som objektiv og nødvendig sand viden.

KarinJønch-Clausen and Klemens Kappel: Social Epistemic Liberalism andNon-Scientific Belief

Recentlyit has been argued that the basic institutions of liberal democracy may bejustified from a social epistemic standpoint. Moreover, Robert Talisse hasargued that a social epistemic justification of liberal democracy can beendorsed by most, if not all, reasonable citizens and that the approach thusmeets the challenges of reasonable pluralism as put forth in John Rawls’influential Political Liberalism. We refer to this as the Social Epistemic JustificationDoctrine (SEJD). In our paper we argue that SEJD either fails or has a muchmore narrow scope than it claims. Depending on the interpretation of theepistemic assumptions harbored in Talisse’s idea of the reasonable, either (i)SEJD excludes as unreasonable a significant group of religious citizenswho base their moral worldviews on a core of non-scientific beliefs or (ii)SEJD does include these citizens as reasonable, but many of these citizens willreasonably reject SEJD’s central claim that open reason-exchange fostered byliberal institutions is conducive to good epistemic ends. In eitherinterpretation, SEJD fails to accommodate citizens who base their moralworldviews on non-scientific beliefs; citizens who may for non-epistemicreasons be engaged and willing participants of liberal democracy.

KlausFrovin Jørgensen, Gödel og semantikken for

intuitionistisklogic

Abstract:Kurt Gödel viste i 1930, at klassisk logik havde en elegant og tilfredsstilendesemantik, der baserede sig på at give formler mening i forhold til to og kun tosandhedsværdier, nemlig “sand” og “falsk”. Derved skabte Gödel ækvivalensmellem sandhed og bevisbarhed. Samtidigt blev den intuitionistiske logikudviklet af Heyting og Kolmogorov, først og fremmest. Imidlertid baserede denneudvikling sig på et meget heurisktisk og matematisk utilfredsstillendegrundlag, nemlig den såkaldte bevisfortolkning. Senere i 30-erne arbejdedeGödel ihærdigt med at få givet en tilfredsstillende semantik for denintuitionistiske logik. I 1933 viste Gödel eksempelvis ækvivalens mellemmodallogikken S4 og den udsagnslogiske del af den intuitionistiske logik. Menda semantikken for modallogikken ligeledes var ikke-eksisterende, hjalp detteresultat ikke meget. Ligeledes viste Gödel i 1933, at man kunne oversætte fraklassisk logik til intuitionistisk logik på en sådan måde, at man med denneoversættelse kunne vise, at hvis klassisk logik er inkonsistent, så erintuitionistisk logik det også. Det er tydeligt, at Gödel på baggrund af detteblev i tvivl om intuitionistisk logik nu også er en logik, som er konstruktivttilfredsstillende. Men i slutningen af 30-erne skaber Gödel et gennembrud iforhold til at forstå den intuitionistiske logik. Med sin såkaldteDialectica-fortolkning viser han nemlig, at intuitionistisk logik faktisk er enkonstruktiv logik over den elementære talteori. Ydermere formår Gödel med sinfortolkning at give en konkretisering af Heytings og Kolmogorovsbevisfortolkning, således at Gödel i et vist omfang kunne skifte denne ud meddet matematisk præcise begreb om primitiv rekursion i højere typer. Derved varGödel nået et langt skridt videre i forhold til at få givet en semantik for denintuitionistiske logik. Men der bestod visse problemer ved Gödels løsning. Idette foredrag vil jeg gennemgå disse problemer og skitsere, hvordan vi med denmoderne logik har fået en tilfredsstillende løsning på Gödels problemer

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JesperKallestrup: Towards Epistemic Social Externalism

Sosa(2007), Greco (2009) and other robust virtue epistemologists (RVE) hold thatall knowledge is belief that is true because of a cognitive ability.Testimonial knowledge poses a problem for RVE. Thus Lackey (2007)envisages cases in which the testifier?s cognitive abilities are what bestexplain the agent?s cognitive success. Friends of RVE typically rejoin byanalyzing such knowledge in terms of the agent?s reliable abilities forreceiving and evaluating pieces of  testimony. This paper sets up anepistemic social externalist argument to the effect that whether an agent hastestimonial knowledge inherently depends on possibly unknown features of herepistemic community. Following Goldberg (forthcoming), the communal epistemiclabor is divided in such ways that agents epistemically depend on others tomonitor and police testimonial processes. By fixing all local facts andpertinent cognitive abilities possessed by the agent and her intrinsicduplicate, while unwittingly shifting such hidden environmental features, theagent will possess testimonial knowledge that her duplicate lacks. The upshotis that RVE understates the social dimension of knowledge in that not allknowledge is true belief fully credible to the agent.

KlemensKappel: Knowledge, Truth by Luck, and What Solves the Gettier Problem

Itis not difficult to invent string of cases of the sort that Edmund Gettier usedto convince generations of philosophers that something was amiss with the viewthat knowledge just is justified true belief. Indeed, at striking feature ofthe Gettier Problem the ease with which such cases can be generated. Anyonewith a modest training in philosophy can fairly quicly see how they work, andthen proceed to invent new cases. It has, however, turned out to beconsiderably more difficult - to say the least - to provide a solution to theGettier Problem, that is, a fix of traditional or less traditional theories ofknowledge that yields whatever is needed. Indeed, it does not seem that anyproposed solution to the Gettier Problem has gained support outside the oftenfairly small circles that sponsor them, and this is so even if one abstractsaway other variances about how to understand knowledge. In itself, this stateof affairs is puzzling, even for philosophy. How can it be that that an easilygraspable shortcoming of a definition of a concept that we use so often is sodifficult to unravel? An other quite puzzling feature is this: why is it thatproposed solutions to the Gettier Problem so often are susceptible to intricatecounter-examples of the same general family, rather than new to problemsor other types of counter-examples? And what is the solution to the GettierProblem, anyway?

Inthis paper, I propose a new unified view about the Gettier Problem, a view thatincludes a diagnosis of the problem that suggests answers to the sort ofquestions just mentioned, as well as a generic solution to the Gettier Problem.I offer an argument that the Gettier Problem not only seems unsolvable, butactually is unsolvable. This is what I call the Fallibility Argument.One crucial assumption in the Fallibility Argument is Fallibilism, the viewthat a belief can be justified or warranted, and yet false. Another is what Icall the Strong Condition of Adequacy. This is a condition on acceptablesolutions to the Gettier Problem, roughly holding that a solution to theGettier Problem is successful only if it identifies a condition such that noGettier Incident is possible. The strategy of the paper is argue that the keyto solving the Gettier Problem is that one should retain Fallibilism, but rejectthe Strong Condition of Adequacy.

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MetteEngelbrecht Larsen: Nik Weavers matematiske konceptualisme

NikWeaver er professor fra Washington Universitet. Han har de seneste år arbejdet med en position, som han kalder matematisk konceptualisme. Matematisk konceptualisme er tænkt som et alternativ til mængdelæren som grundlag for matematikken, og det kan groft sagt ses som en moderne matematisk prædikativisme. Positionen er derfor kontroversiel og filosofisk interessant. Jeg vil fremlægge hovedtrækkene i Nik Weavers konceptualisme, og jeg vil efterfølgende problematisere og diskutere positionen.

ThorbjørnBach Larsen: Real virtuality: Deleuzian ontology and new technologies

Ithas been noted – e.g. by French philosopher Pierre Lévy – how recent developmentsin areas such as technoscience, finance, and the media poses a challenge totraditional metaphysics: Things /are/ (spatiotemporally) not the way they usedto, it is said. Lévy, drawing on Deleuze’s concepts of the virtual and theactual, describes this transformation in terms of an increasing/virtualization/ – i.e. a change in reality from one mode of being to another.I propose here to investigate the ontological assumptions behind this claimthrough a critical elaboration of the ontology of Deleuze and its recentapplication in the philosophy of Manuel DeLanda.

Kasper Lysemose

Kierkegaard om udødeligheden

- eksistentialiseringen af en antropologiskkategori

Entese lyder, at den moderne tid i princippet om selvopretholdelse fandt sin egenfornuft. Er det tilfældet, kan det ikke forbavse, hvis moderne antropologisktænkning kendetegnes ved kategorier, der svarer til fornuftensselvopretholdelse. Blandt disse svar finder man udødelighedspostulatet. Såledesviste Kant, at skal mennesket besvare den fordring, som moralloven stiller,dvs. skal mennesket betjene sig af ”maksimen om fornuftens selvopretholdelse”,da må udødeligheden postuleres. At den derimod ikke kan være genstand for etteoretisk bevis, godtgjorde Kant som bekendt også. Ikke desto mindre forbliverdet forhold, at udødeligheden skalpostuleres praktisk en teoretisk erkendelse snarere end en eksistentielerfaring – og på det punkt sætter Kierkegaard ind: udødeligheden angår ikkeblot mennesket abstrakt, dvs. som fornuftsvæsen, men som person. Deneksistentielle erfaring, der først giver udødeligheden adgang til atstrukturere handlingslivet, forsøger Kierkegaard at anspore ved at sige, at”udødeligheden er dommen”. Som sådan viser udødeligheden sig som et negativtfænomen, og spørgsmålet bliver, om jeg overhovedet kan postulere det, som fornuften kræver af mig. Der åbnes etperspektiv af typen: Kan jeg ville, at jeg uigenkaldeligt forbliver den, jegvar? At kunne besvare dette spørgsmål bekræftende kan ses som den højeste formfor human selvopretholdelse.

SuneLægaard: Klimaflygtninge

Klimaforandringernehar allerede i dag sat gang i migration flere steder i verden. Det forekommeroplagt, at problemet med befolkningsgrupper der forsøger at flygte overlandegrænser som følge af temperaturstigningerne, vil mangedobles fremover. Menhvilken betydning bør statslige og nationale grænser tillægges, nårflygtningepresset på et land vokser? Dette rejser spørgsmål både om globalretfærdighed, hvem der kvalificerer som flygtninge, staters rettigheder tilderes territorium og til at ekskludere flygtninge fra det. Oplægget vildiskutere disse begreber og nogle nylige argumenter omkring klimaflygninge.

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MichaelMay: Distributed cognition and artefacts: affordances and/or representations

Theconcept of Distributed Cognition (DC) has been elaborated in Cognitive Sciencein different versions and applied to the analysis and design of technicalartefacts. The focus in DC is on the role of tools, models and externalrepresentations as “cognitive artefacts” that can support human reasoning,communication and collaboration in different ways. There is a tension withinthese approaches, however, with regard to the role of representations andmeaning. This tension can be exploited within a critical examination of therelated concept of affordance – a concept that has found widespread use withinapplied theories of design. The focus in these theories is on the “directperception” of affordances of technical artefacts – thus attempting to avoidsemantic issues. The problems arising from this approach will be exemplifiedthrough the framework for the analysis and design of complex technicalinterfaces called Ecological Interface Design (a framework within CognitiveEngineering / Cognitive Ergonomics).

SørenArani Mortensen: Musik & kontekstuel erkendelse

Iforedraget undersøges følgende spørgsmål i forhold til musik og lyd: Ermusikalsk betydning kontekstuel? Får lyde og musikalske fænomener betydning ikraft af kontekst? Og kan musikken selv være den kontekst, hvori andrefænomener kan siges at have betydning? Kan et musikalsk værk siges at udtrykkefølelser eller begivenheder i kraft af den kontekst, som vi hører musikken i?Og kan et musikalsk værk påvirke betydningen af de fænomener, som musikkensiges at udtrykke?

Isærprobabilistisk epistemologi, som denne anvendes inden for musikforskningen, ogkontekstualisme, som denne anvendes inden for moderne erkendelsesteori, synesoplagte som tilgange til undersøgelsen af disse spørgsmål. Probabilistiskepistemologi er den forskningstese inden for musikforskningen, hvor musiktildeles betydning i kraft af, hvorvidt lytterens forventninger til et givetmusikalsk forløb bliver indfriet eller ej. Epistemisk kontekstualisme erbeslægtet med probabilistisk epistemologi, men er også en mere generelfilosofisk doktrin om den menneskelige erkendelse. Foredraget undersøger,hvorvidt probabilistisk epistemologi og epistemisk kontekstualisme kan biddragetil afklaringen af ovenstående spørgsmål.

SørenArani Mortensen: Music & Contextual Knowledge

Inthis lecture the following questions with relation to music and sound areinvestigated: Is musical meaning contextual? Do sounds and musical phenomenaacquire meaning due to contexts? And are sounds or musical phenomena themselvesable to provide the context in which other phenomena obtain meaning? Can amusical work be said to express emotions or events due to the contexts in whichwe hear the musical work? And can a musical work influence the meaning of thephenomena that the musical work may be said to express?

Especiallyprobabilistic epistemology as employed within musicology and contextualism asemployed within modern philosophical epistemology appear to be useful asapproaches to the above questions. Probabilistic epistemology is a currentmusic research program in which music and sound are said to be meaningful byvirtue of whether or not the listener’s expectations or met. Epistemiccontextualism is related to probabilistic epistemology, but is also a moregeneral philosophical doctrine regarding human knowledge. The lectureinvestigates whether probabilistic epistemology and epistemic contextualism cancontribute to answering the above questions.

DitteMarie Munch-Hansen: Afsky: den umoralske aktørs moralfølelse?

DaHeinrich Himmler var vidne til en nedskydning af 100 jøder i Minsk, brød hanefter sigende sammen og kastede op. Er en sådan fysisk oplevelse af ubehagudtryk for, at han forstod det grusomme og umoralske i situationen? Ikke kunhøjtplacerede gerningsmænd oplever dette fysiske ubehag, det er et velkendtfænomen, at soldater oplever et voldsom fysisk ubehag i form af fx kvalme,opkast eller svimmelhed,  når de bliver beordret til at begå grusomhederimod civile eller vidne til sådanne forbrydelser. Ikke desto mindre fører dennespontane afsky ikke nødvendigvis til en moralsk handling, de fleste lærer atoverkomme denne impuls og nogle udvikler sig til at brutale og sadistiskegerningsmænd.

Ioplægget vil jeg analysere filosofiske og socialpsykologiske fortolkninger afdette fænomen, og samtidig undersøge nazisternes egen selvforståelse ogitalesættelse af fænomenet. Selv hvis denne afsky i nogle tilfælde kan forståssom en moralsk følelse, så virker det til, at vi har at gøre med en impotentmoralfølelse, der ikke giver tilstrækkelig motivation for moralsk handling, ogsom i nogle tilfælde måske kan give grundlag for umoralske handlinger.

EmilLundbjerg Møller: On What to Believe about How We Ought to Think

Thepresentation focusses on interconnections between epistemic rationality andtheories of how to individuate mental content. Special attention will be givento Timothy Williamson’s (2000) conception of theoretical rationality whenconsidered in connection with his rather radical externalism about contentindividuation. I argue that the Williamsonian picture of theoreticalrationality provides the wrong verdict in a number of cases, and I show thatthe shortcoming of Williamson’s picture is its inability to take into accountthe extent to which a subject understands or grasps the content of herexternally or broadly individuated mental states.

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NikolajNottelmann: Against Deontic Uniqueness

Inrecent work, a.o. Jeffrey Glick have argued roughly that given an agent A withaccess to a certain total evidence-base E and a proposition p considered as acandidate for belief by A, there is only one doxastic attitude from the set{belief, disbelief, suspension of belief} which A could non-culpably take wirhregard to p. Even more recently, Rik Peels and Tony Booth have argued against thistype of deontic uniqueness thesis (DUT). In the present paper I mean primarilyto sharpen the case against this type of DUT. I do this by considering otherDUTs, which also turn out to be unjustifiable, thus undermining the force ofthe kind of DUT discussed by Glick.

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FinnOlesen: Teknologifilosofi og telemedicinsk mediering

Idisse år ændres statens forhold til borgerne på centrale områder med øgetselv-forvaltning til følge. Forholdet er i væsentlig grad muliggjort afteknologisk mediering. I oplægget diskuteres synlige og mulige forskydninger i ansvarsfordelingenmellem patient, borger og stat med udgangspunkt i tesen, at denne medieringikke er et neutralt middel for menneskelig handling. I stedet konstituerespatient og telemedicin i praksisrelationen.

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Mogens Pahuus: Skyld og skam.

Demange forskellige former for skamfølelse og skyldfølelse er knyttet til dendimension af vort liv, hvor vi er optaget af (holdnings- og handlingsmæssigt)hvad der vigtigt (værdier, idealer) og rigtigt (appeller, fordringer). Skam ogskyld er følelser, der optræder, hvor vi svigter i forhold til henholdsvisværdier/idealer og appeller/fordringer. Men der er også ord og udtryk (som fx"gøre sin skyldighed" og "have skam i livet"), som går påselve optagetheden af hvad der vigtigt og rigtigt. Oplægget forsøger dels atgive et samlet billede af dette felt af (positive) holdninger/tilbøjelighederog af (negative) affekter, dels at give en model for forståelsen af følelsernesfelt generelt som på tilsvarende vis spændt ud mellem holdninger/tilbøjelighederog affekter.

David BudtzPedersen: Explanation,reductionism and the future

Scientific reductionismhas probably existed ever since the origin of modern science. Plausible reasonsfor this could be (i) that reductionism generates a clear programmaticstatement within an emerging discipline; (ii) that it enables convergence towardsspecific epistemic goals; or (iii) that it is based on beliefs of – real oranticipated – reductive explanation and predictability (Rohrlich 2001).Meanwhile, this paper suggests an additional reason (iv) that claims thatincentives imposed from outside science play an equally important role inmotivating reductionist propositions. Taking into account that scientists in anumber of situations (e.g. in grant proposals, media reports etc.) have toextrapolate promises and expectations of ever more radical scientific findings,reductionism becomes an effective way of claiming the relative priority of adiscipline above others. Here, I take the example of future-orientedexplanations in neuroscience.

StigAndur Pedersen: Numerisk Algoritme. Et begreb i drift

Dethar siden 1930’erne været en generelt accepteret opfattelse, at Church-Turingstese gav en fyldestgørende bestemmelse af, hvad en algoritme var. Men detvidenskabelige landskab har ændret sig. De første elektroniske computere framidten af det 20. århundrede gav forskere nye muligheder, men ændrede ikkemeget i opfattelsen af, hvad algoritmer var. Men de startede en ny eksponentielvækst, som i dag har ført til et nyt paradigme: Videnskab er blevet tile-videnskab. På det praktisk plan udvikler mange forskere ikke længere selvalgoritmer eller skriver maskinkode. De lever i en scientific computationalenvironment med store online algoritmepakker, supercomputere og klynger afprocessorer. Karakteren af maskinarkitektur og algoritmer har skiftet karakterog karakteren af, hvad vi anser for beregneligt, er under udvikling. Vi vildiskutere denne udvikling hen imod et nyt computational science paradigm.

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SørenRiis: The Ultimate Technology: The End ofTechnology and the Task of Biology

Heideggerdied prior to the exceptional cloning of the sheep Dolly and before Dr. Venterstarted his experiments with the creation of synthetic life forms and he neverexplicitly discussed biotechnology. However, by reinterpreting Heidegger’snotion of ‘modern technology’, this paper will show how it becomes possible tophilosophically assess biotechnology and to recognise ways in which Heideggeranticipates this phenomenon. At one and the same time the followinginterpretation elucidates the fundamental coming-into-being of biotechnologyand presents biotechnology as the ultimate technology as well as what Heideggercalls the ‘saving power’. The thesis of this paper is that biotechnology is notjust one more technology; rather it is the perfection

ofwhat has already been understood as technology by Aristotle.

 
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KasperSchølin: Heidegger i praksis

Heideggerskriver et sted: ”Das Denken verleiht unmittelbar keine Krafte zum Handeln”.Men udelukker dette, at vi kan anvende Heideggers tænkning, som et analytiskredskab til at forstå konkrete teknologier og deres handlinger? Oplæggetudfordres af spørgsmålet og forsøger at analysere en konkret teknologi,ultralydsskanneren, med Heideggers begreber om bl.a. teknologi, Zeug ogvaretagelse (besorgen). 

SuneBjarke Stefansson: Intellectual Property from an epistemic point of view

Froman epistemic point of view we should clearly not endorse current intellectualproperty rights. For, while supposedly providing an incentive for theproduction of knowledge, current intellectual property rights also burdens freespeech, prevents criticism and stifles scientific research—things all conduciveto epistemic ends. So why not reject intellectual property rights?

However,it might be that some set of intellectual property rights are necessaryfor maximal knowledge production and thus intellectual propertyrights cannot be discounted altogether. But whether we shouldendorse some intellectual property rights rests on a more fundamentalassumption, namely that knowledge is something which can be traded on a market.Since this assumption is dubious it might provide a viable way to rejectintellectual property rights. 

AsgerSteffensen: Modal epistemology and Conceivability

Philosophicalargumentation often depends on modal facts, i.e. facts about what is possible,contingent, or necessary. For thought and cognition outside the domain ofphilosophy modal facts are also often decisive. It seems we have an easy accessto modal facts, but how so? Through a presentation of the state-of-the-art inmodal epistemology I wish to outline a research project based on conceivabilitythat will try to explain how we come to know modal facts.

HenrikKragh Sørensen: Mellem eksperimenter, billeder og beviser: Hvordan”eksperimentelle” matematiske resultater bliver robuste

Sidenmidten af 1990erne er flere grupper af matematikere begyndt at diskuteretilgange til matematikken, der udmærker sig som mere ”eksperimentelle” end detraditionelle metoder og filosofiske selvforståelser. Denne diskussion er isærafstedkommet af nye muligheder, som er blevet åbnet ved computerens udbredelseog forøgede regne- og visualiseringskraft. De mest radikale stemmer i dissediskussioner taler om, at matematikken står overfor nye åbne vidder, hvor det”at vide at” langt må overskygge traditionelle bevisers begrænsninger. Og netopved hjælp af computere og en mere ”eksperimentel” tilgang kan man opdage meget,hævdes det, som man ikke kan – eller ikke behøver – give traditionelle beviserfor.

Imidlertidargumenterer flertallet af de såkaldte” eksperimentelle matematikere” for, atman stadig må søge beviser. Men den proces, hvori et eksperimentelt resultatudvikles til og forsynes med et (stringent) bevis er ikke af disse fortalerefor eksperimentel matematik gjort til genstand for problematisering ogdiskussion. I mit foredrag vil jeg ved hjælp af eksempler skitsere deinvolverede filosofiske problemer samt diskutere, hvorvidt et begreb somWimsatt’s ”robusthed” kan hjælpe til at afklare dem.

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Mads Vestergaard: Kunstighedens ontologi

Foredraget argumenterer for den tese, at i naturvidenskabens teknologiske omgang med naturen - inklusiv den levende natur - opløses forskellen på natur og artefakt. Alt bliver “kunstigt” i videnskabens optik og naturen bliver følgende til et mulighedsfelt for fremstilling og manipulation. Hos Bacon sker der en realistisk ontologisering af teknologiske fremstillingsbetingelser, der også kan afdækkes i den neobaconianske teknologifilosofi, hvis kvasi-kreationistiske resultat vil blive belyst med eksempler hentet fra fysikken, kemien og bioteknologien.

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Thomas Schwarz Wentzer: Mennesket,det responsive væsen

Foredragetvil skitsere muligheden for at bruge begrebet 'responsivitet' ifilosofisk-antropologiske sammenhæng. Begrebet bruges for at beskrivemenneskets selv-, med- og verdensforhold. Begrebet undgår såvel naturalistiskekonnotationer (så som adaption, reaktion) som rationalistiske antropologier(responsiveness to reasons), men har et fænomenologisk-hermeneutisk fundament.